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Abstract 
Over the last year there has been an extreme devaluation of technology stocks and an 
alarming number of companies either laying off employees or going out of business. A 
significant portion of these companies are dot coms, the same companies that just two years 
ago were credited with revolutionizing the way business is done and with ushering in the 
"new" economy. 
On March 10,2000 the "new" economy peaked when the NASDAQ Composite Index 
closed at a record high of 5,048.62 points. Soon thereafter the market started to slide. The 
slide evolved into a year-long fall and on March 12,2001 the NASDAQ closed at 1,923.38 
points. What was the reason for such a dramatic downturn? 
As it turned out the viability of many of the dot coms was called into question. Analysts had 
serious doubts whether the "revolutionary" companies could ever become profitable. After 
all, some of the most celebrated dot coms had yet to earn a profit. Companies like 
Priceline.com had received hundreds of millions of dollars in financing, had extremely 
lucrative initial public offerings, and yet continued to show a loss. Business owners and 
investors alike searched for reasons behind the poor performances. 
It was soon apparent that the assumptions on which many of these companies were basing 
their business decisions were inaccurate. Those assumptions and the reasons for their 
inaccuracies are examined through a series of discussions. Once those inaccuracies are 
addressed, several profit seeking concepts, based on traditional business principles, are 
defined. In addition, effects of the Internet on those concepts are examined. Finally, 
Priceline's situation is analyzed and recommendations are made that demonstrate the 
relevance of traditional business principles in today's economy. 
These discussions show that the economy has evolved as a result of the Internet, but it is not 
necessarily new. Though powerful and exciting, the Internet is only a tool. No tool, not even 
the Intemet, can make traditional business principles obsolete. The events over the past year 
are a testament to that fact. 
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Introduction 
Prior to the year 2000 the phrase "dot com" was somewhat prestigious. Droves of 
people left high-ranking positions with established companies to work for dot-com 
companies. Businesses that had a ".com" after their names seemed to be instantly credible 
and worthy of millions upon millions of investment dollars. And why not - companies like 
Netscape, Yahoo!, and Amazon were making investors wealthy beyond their wildest dreams. 
Quick and profitable returns from Internet investments became very popular. A large return 
with minimal effort was the ultimate status symbol (Napoli, 2000). 
Yahoo! provides an example of the type of dot-com company investors pursued. 
Currently Yahoo! is a global Internet communications, commerce, and media company that 
offers a branded network of services to millions of users daily (Yahoo.com, 2000). David 
Filo and Jerry Yang, Ph.D. candidates in Electrical Engineering at Stanford University, 
founded the company in 1994. In April of that year the two developers started compiling lists 
to keep track of their personal interests on the Internet (Hill & Jones, 1997). As they grew, 
the lists became more and more complex. Eventually the lists were converted into a 
customized database designed to serve the needs of the thousands of users beginning to use 
the service - Yahoo! was bom. On April 12,1996 Yahoo! went public. Its stock opened at 
$24.50 per share and on January 4, 2000 its share price reached an all-time high of $250.00 
{The Wall Street Journal, 2000). 
Well-publicized companies like Yahoo!, Netscape, and Amazon took center stage in 
the business world. As a result of the hype surrounding their initial performance on the stock 
market and the continued growth of the Internet, virtually every market was saturated by "me 
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too" companies. New companies desperately tried to parlay the power of the Internet into the 
perceived financial success associated with the notoriety of the dot coms (Napoli, 2000). 
During the 1990's it appeared that most Internet ventures would do just that. Venture 
capitalists (VCs) were quick to fund new Internet related businesses and for good reason. 
Monstrous Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) seemed an everyday occurrence and early dot-com 
investors made millions of dollars. Unfortunately, the market conditions that fueled the start­
up craze during the 1990's would not last forever. 
In March of 2000 analysts began to question the viability of the dot coms. VCs soon 
realized that many companies they were investing in were not actually viable businesses 
(Napoli, 2000). This realization cast an ominous shadow over all dot coms and suddenly an 
investment once considered a sure thing was deemed risky. This had a dramatic effect on the 
financial markets. Stock prices of the dot coms, which had been fueling the markets, faltered 
(See Exhibit A). Yahoo! illustrates this point. In October of 2000, just ten months after its 
share price reached an all-time high of $250.00, it had fallen to $45.00 {The Wall Street 
Journal, 2000). Securing second and third-round funding became more difficult as analysts 
and investors grew increasingly cautious. In the end, many dot coms could not survive (See 
Appendix A). APBNews.com was one such company. 
APBNews provided a Website that covered the nation's justice, criminal, and safety 
system and it recently went out of business (Davidson, 2000). During its nine-month 
existence, APBNews lured high quality, experienced journalists by offering substantial 
salaries and stock options. It steadily increased its payroll by eventually hiring 140 writers 
and support staff. In June of 2000 APBNews announced it was laying off all employees 
because it was out of money. Ironically, just days after the announcement. The National 
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Press Club named APBNews the Web's best news website (Kelsey, June 2000). The 
company filed for bankruptcy one month later (Kelsey, July 2000). 
How could these things happen? How could a news website like APBNews, which 
produced award-winning content, go out of business? How could the market value of a 
company like Yahoo! drop 82 percent in ten months? The answer in a nutshell is that many 
analysts, investors, and the dot coms themselves were caught up in the euphoria of the "new" 
economy. They were so caught up that they overlooked some important business principles. 
These oversights provide the foundation for examining the recent decline of dot-com 
companies. 
Paper Overview 
This paper is intended to demonstrate that, although the economy of today has 
evolved as a result of the Internet, traditional business principles are still relevant. The first 
section addresses some of the terminology frequently used in the popular press. The section 
then defines the difference between e-business and e-commerce and addresses the "new" 
economy debate. Clarifications made in the first section are the basis for the second section, 
which focuses on some of the specific business principles that have been overlooked. The 
second section also examines how the selected principles have evolved as a result of the 
technological advances of the past 30 years. It concludes by summarizing the principles 
discussed using the strategy development and implementation model. 
The third section examines one of the most well-known dot coms today -
Priceline.com. A brief history of the company is presented and recommendations made as to 
how Priceline might use the principles discussed in the paper to achieve true financial 
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success. To further justify the suggestions, a comparison is made between the performances 
of Priceline and an industry competitor that also uses the Internet to reach its customers. 
Finally, the paper summarizes various arguments made throughout the paper and examines 
their collective contributions and limitations. 
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Common Misconceptions 
The rapid evolution and integration of the Internet into the world of business spawned 
a plethora of new terminology and phrases. While many terms are straightforward, e.g. "e-
mail," other terms are broader and take on multiple meanings. These terms are hard to define 
because people use them differently. For instance, many people use the terms "Internet" and 
"World Wide Web" interchangeably, when in reality they are two different things. 
The Internet is a vast collection of computer networks interconnected both physically 
and through their ability to encode and decode certain specialized communications protocols 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2000). The World Wide Web is the collection of computers on the Internet 
that support a hypertext function that allows users to follow items of interest in a nonlinear 
fashion by selecting words or pictures of interest and immediately gaining more information 
on the items selected (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). The World Wide Web actually runs on the 
Internet, so by definition the Internet and the World Wide Web are two different things. This 
paper will generally use the term Internet in reference to the many ways companies can use 
the Internet to improve business functions. This includes, but is not limited to the World 
Wide Web. 
The terms e-business and e-commerce and the phrase "the new economy" are also 
used without much thought being given to their actual meanings. As this paper focuses 
specifically on how businesses are using not only the terminology, but also the technology it 
refers to, these terms must be clearly defined and examined. The examination of the 
interpretation and application of recent technological advances is also important because they 
serve as the basis of the discussions throughout this paper. 
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The Internet 
As stated, the Internet is a network of computer networks. This description is not 
meant to downplay the impact that the Internet has had on the economy over the last ten 
years, but rather to provide perspective. It helps to think of the Internet as a multiple purpose 
tool because it has a universal reach, acts as a distribution channel, and streamlines the 
interactions between transacting parties (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). As is evident in this 
description, the Internet is indeed a powerful tool. However, the Internet, like any tool, has 
limitations. 
The Internet cannot be used as a substitute for business strategy or for the underlying 
principles on which business strategies are founded. For example, if a construction company 
acquired the latest and greatest tool available and trained its employees to use it, could that 
company then substitute that tool in place of its business strategy? Would constructing high 
quality projects for its customers no longer be important? Would profitability become 
irrelevant? The answer to all of these questions is a resounding "No." There simply is no 
tool, no matter how powerful, that a business could use in place of business strategy, quality 
products, and profitability. 
The Internet Does Not Deserve All The Credit 
Unfortunately, many companies made the mistake of using the Internet for jobs it was 
never intended to do. Part of the reason for this misuse is the dramatic effect the Internet has 
had on the economy over the last ten years. In the early 1990's, as the Internet transitioned 
from a government-funded entity used by universities and researchers to the commercially 
driven entity that it is today, the economy boomed. That sudden boom gave the impression 
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that the Internet alone could do almost anything. In reality, though, it is not just the Internet 
that should be credited with changing the way the world works and communicates. After all, 
the Internet infrastructure has been around since the late 1960's (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). The 
past 30 years have seen a number of other technological advances that have contributed to 
changing today's economy perhaps even more than the Internet. 
Consider the introduction of the personal computer (PC), which coincided with the 
introduction of the microprocessor in the early 1970's. As prices dropped and microprocessor 
technology advanced, the PC continued to evolve. In the early 1980's the modem 
microcomputer, now simply known as a computer, was introduced (Encyclopedia Britannica, 
2000). As technological advances drove prices down, companies like Microsoft and Apple 
made computers easier to use. With the introduction of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), 
computers were accessible to the average user and soon widely adopted {Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2000). These events preceded the Internet as it is known today and deserve just 
as much of the credit for impacting today's economy. In fact, the introduction of the PC and 
widespread growth in its use provided the infrastructure necessary for the applications and 
uses of the Internet today. 
e-Business vs. e-Commerce 
E-business and e-conmierce are both loosely defined as doing business via the 
Internet. Much like the terms Internet and the World Wide Web, e-business and e-commerce 
are related; however, the terms are not interchangeable. E-business is actually more of an 
umbrella-term for a company that uses the Internet or the Web to facilitate any business 
function (Techweb.com, 2000). E-commerce, on the other hand, implies that goods or 
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services can actually be purchased (Techweb.com, 2000). To illustrate this distinction, an e-
business website may be very comprehensive and offer more than just the ability to purchase 
products or services. For example, it may feature a general search facility, the ability to track 
shipments, or have an area designated for threaded discussions. In this instance, e-commerce 
is only the order and payment-processing component of the site. 
As a general rule, any time a business uses the Internet to conduct a business process, 
whether it is simply communicating through e-mail or marketing its product or services 
through an elaborately developed website, it is participating in e-business. Conversely, a 
business is participating in e-commerce if and only if its customers have the ability to order 
and purchase its products or services via the Internet. 
Is There A New Economy? 
Another term that is often used today is "the new economy." Although technological 
advances since 1970 have changed the very way in which businesses and consumers interact, 
have they actually resulted in a "new" economy? A comparison of traditional mail and e-mail 
can be used to help clarify the conceptual basis of this question. Traditional mail is sent and 
received very differently from e-mail. However, the concept of sending a document of some 
sort from one location to another is essentially the same. For instance, reliability, expediency, 
and security are relevant with both methods. 
A similar standard can be applied to the economy. Although today's post-Intemet 
economy differs from the pre-Intemet economy, it is fundamentally the same. Or is it? There 
are powerful arguments on both sides, which make the debate worth examining. 
Much has been said about the "new" economy in recent months. Politicians are trying 
to take credit for it, numerous books are trying to help people master it, and businesses are 
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struggling to survive in it. Ironically, even though so much has been written and said about 
the "new" economy in the recent months, no one seems to know exactly what it is. Those that 
have been brave enough to define today's economy cite the shift from the industrial age to 
the information age as the basis of their definition (Wired, 2000). The question remains: Is 
the post-Internet economy actually different from the pre-Intemet economy? Or rather - Is 
there a "new" economy? 
Distinguishing Economic Characteristics 
Before this question can be addressed, a framework of similar characteristics must be 
established so that comparisons can be made and conclusions reached. Since the post-Intemet 
economy has not been around long, problems arise. Its relative newness makes it difficult to 
produce a clear definition that correlates with established concepts. Despite the difficulties 
involved, it makes sense to seek out common economic characteristics. Many of the wide-
ranging qualitative and quantitative economic models are beyond the scope of this 
discussion; still, a rational comparison can be made using basic economic theory. 
The primary characteristic selected for comparison is output growth. However, 
unemployment rates and inflation rates are also relevant and will be used in the discussion as 
well. Output growth depends on two factors - labor productivity growth, the overall gain in 
production from one year to the next, and labor supply growth, the overall increase in the 
hours worked from one year to the next (Stiroh, 1999). Accurately measuring and comparing 
output from one period of time, like the 1950's, to that of another period of time, like the 
1990's, is a point of contention among many economists (Stiroh, 1999). For simplicity's 
sake, this discussion assumes production measures are accurate over time. 
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Since labor productivity is defined in terms of outputs per hour, it stands to reason 
that it relies on the factors that would allow a worker to produce more output per hour of 
labor (Stiroh, 1999). For example, labor productivity growth is dependent on factors such as 
refined training methods or improved technologies that allow employed individuals to work 
more efficiently and produce more output per hour of labor. Labor supply growth is 
dependent on factors such as decreased population growth rates or modified workplace 
regulations that influence the number of employable individuals available to work in a given 
industry (Stiroh, 1999). 
Since 1975 both labor productivity and labor supply have grown approximately one 
percent per year, so the total output growth of the U.S. economy has been about two or two 
and a half percent per year (Krugman, 1997). This increasing growth rate has been achieved 
while unemployment rates remained basically constant. Therefore, more people can be 
employed from year to year, yet, the overall level of unemployment stays within a range 
considered healthy from an economic standpoint (Krugman, 1997). It is considered healthy 
because historically, if there were a period of time where unemployment rates fell below 
what is considered the natural rate (approximately five and six tenths percent), inflation rates 
would climb at an accelerated rate. The opposite held true if unemployment rates climbed 
above the natural rate (Krugman, 1997). 
To clarify, historically there has been a finite amount of output that could be 
produced over a finite period of time. The output growth rate, or rather, the total increase in 
products and services produced from one year to the next, could grow only at about two 
percent per year. The number of employed individuals available, as well as the rates at which 
they could produce the output, both grew only at about one percent per year. Output growth 
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also influenced employment levels, which in turn, affected inflation rates. Specifically, over 
the past 25 years, the level of inflation was inversely related to any deviation from the natural 
rate of unemployment (Krugman, 1997). 
Therefore, the output growth rates and the way in which they interact with 
unemployment levels and inflation rates can be considered common characteristics of the 
economy before and after the advent of the Internet as it exists today. These periods will be 
referred to as the pre- and post-Internet economies for the remainder of this paper. Although 
this is admittedly a simplified example, the characteristics used are relevant and are based on 
fundamental economic principles. Therefore, if characteristics of the post-Internet economy 
interact differently than they did in the pre-Intemet economy, those differences would help 
substantiate the existence of a "new" economy. 
Analysis Of Characteristic Comparison 
When the way in which the output growth rates interacting with unemployment levels 
and inflation rates during the 1990's are compared to the interactions over the previous 25 
years, significant differences become apparent. The analysis of the post-Internet economy's 
characteristics suggests that the U.S. economy would enjoy an on-going period of 
permanently faster output growth that would not lead to increased inflation (Shepard, 1997). 
Recall that output growth is dependent on labor productivity growth and labor supply growth 
and that an increased level of employment historically resulted in inflation. Thus, faster 
output growth rates must be due to an increase in labor productivity. 
Many attribute the apparent increase in labor productivity to the technological 
advances of the 1990's (Shepard, 1997). This sentiment is echoed by "new" economy 
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proponents who believe that today's economy, fueled by a worldwide spread of capitalism, 
globalization of businesses, and the information technology revolution, can now grow faster 
than before without renewed inflation (Shepard, 1997). How much faster? According to an 
article in Business Week, three to four percent annual output growth is now possible. A 
significant increase compared to output growth over the past 25 years (Shepard, 1997). 
A true increase in output growth rates accompanied by sustained inflation rates would 
go a long way in proving that the economy of today is in fact fundamentally different from 
the previous economy and therefore "new." The emergence of a "new" economy, where the 
old models of business and economics no longer apply and where productivity rates increase 
indefinitely, would be unquestionably desirable. However, questions regarding the actual 
increase in productivity need to be addressed. For starters, are workers really more 
productive? 
Economist Stephen Roach calls this the Information Technology Paradox (Roach, 
1998). The paradox claims that despite increased spending by American businesses on 
information technology, overall productivity has not increased as a direct result of the use of 
technology. Investment in information technology quadrupled, rising as a share of business 
spending on equipment from 28 percent during the 1980's to 53 percent during the 1990's 
(Perkins & Perkins, 1999). 
A significant portion of that increase in spending on information technology involves 
maintaining and replacing computer hardware, more than $220 billion annually. About 60 
percent of annual technology budgets are used for hardware replacements and upgrades. The 
remaining 40 percent is allocated to software, service support, and computer management 
staff (Perkins & Perkins, 1999). Overall, corporations spent $1.1 trillion on hardware from 
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1990 to 1996, an increase of approximately $143 billion over previous years. Despite the fact 
that investment in information technology quadrupled during the 1990's, productivity grew 
by only eight tenths of one percent per year - no better than productivity growth over the 
previous 25 years (Perkins & Perkins, 1999). 
Ironically, although productivity is not rising at a significant rate, the number of hours 
the average person works is. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1996 the 
average worker spent 148 more hours working than in 1973 - a total of four working weeks 
longer. Far from being an era of advances in productivity, the connectivity and the 
competition of the post-Internet economy has made it harder for people to get away from 
work. 
These facts attribute the increases in output growth rates of the post-Internet economy 
to the increasing number of labor hours being contributed by existing workers, not 
technologically improved production rates. Thus, employment levels remain relatively 
constant and inflation rates remain normal. These traditional economic lines of reasoning 
suggest that what many consider a "new" economy is simply a progression of the previous 
one. 
Could there be more non-technological reasons for the recent performance of the 
economy? Many opponents of the "new" economy credit the deregulation of businesses and 
effective corporate restructuring for competition in global markets for the recent economic 
boom. For example. Herb Allen Jr. of investment bank Allen & Co. argued, 'The 
streamlining and tightening up of American businesses over the last ten years has paid off." 
(Perkins & Perkins, 1999). 
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Additional arguments attribute more non-technical credit to the economy's recent 
performance. One follows the reasoning that computers pale in comparison to earlier 
technological advances such as electricity, the internal combustion engine, or biotech goods 
(Gordon, 1998). Customers do not value much of the output that is created in the "new" 
economy, often an array of arbitrary information, and some argue that it should not be 
considered output (this ties in to the contention among economists that was mentioned 
earlier) (Gordon, 1998). In addition, the cost of software upgrades, system compatibility 
problems, employee training, and installation downtime combine to reduce the overall 
effectiveness of information technology systems (Stiroh, 1999). 
Comparison Results 
The arguments against the existence of a "new" economy seem to offset the earlier 
arguments that supported the existence of a "new" economy and thus, the discussion has 
come full circle. Unfortunately, as with many debates, there is no definitive answer. Figures 
have been presented that suggest differences in the characteristics of the economy today and 
the economy of the last 25 years, specifically when comparing output growth rates of each 
period. However, other figures illustrate increased investments in technology have not 
resulted in significantly higher productivity rates and attributed the recent economic events to 
non-technological factors. 
Until more data about long-run productivity trends and the structural relationship 
between inflation and unemployment in the post-Internet economy are available, the 
fundamental question of whether or not a "new" economy exists will remain unanswered. In 
the meantime the term "today's economy" will be used in reference to the economic events 
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of the 1990's. Lessons from the past, however, suggest that it is prudent for most businesses 
to temper the hype of the "new" economy and to proceed with caution. 
Why should businesses proceed with caution? Although the Internet is a relatively 
new phenomenon and its effects on the economy have been hard to ignore, old economic 
rules, such as profitability, still apply to businesses competing in today's economy. The 
economy has traditionally evolved as new technologies developed and as markets fluctuated. 
Two quotations, one from 1929 and the other from 1932, illustrate what history has to say 
about mistaking market fluctuations as revolutionary events that make established economic 
rules and traditional business principles obsolete. 
The first quotation from Forbes magazine was written in June of 1929, just four 
months before the stock market crashed. It illustrates the presumptuous and misguided 
economic ideology of that time. "For the last five years we have been in a new industrial era 
in this country. We are making progress industrially and economically not even by leaps and 
bounds, but on a perfectly heroic scale." (Perkins & Perkins, 1999). It seems the existence of 
a "new" economy was debated once before. 
Three years later, Bernard Baruch (1870 - 1965), who was an adviser to American 
presidents on economic matters for more than 40 years (scstatehouse.net, 2000), commented 
on the business practices and philosophies of the 1920's that led to the Great Depression. "In 
the lamentable era of the 'New Economics' culminating in 1929, even in the presence of 
dizzily spiraling prices, if we had all continuously repeated 'two and two still make four,' 
much of the evil might have been averted." (Perkins & Perkins, 1999). While the Forbes' 
quotation familiarly and eerily praised the accomplishments of the 1920's economy, 
Baruch's words admonished the misguided efforts of the times, which ignored the 
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established economic principles and ultimately resulted in a long period of economic 
hardship. 
Discussion Summary 
This discussion first demonstrated how business terminology has evolved as a result 
of the Internet. It then clarified some of that terminology and examined other technological 
advances that have impacted today's economy. The discussion then demonstrated that there 
is no definitive proof that the post-Internet economy is fundamentally different than the pre-
Intemet economy. An analysis of the differences in how the output growth rates interacted 
with unemployment rates and inflation rates illustrated this point. 
History had the final say in the discussion. It warned of the dangerous consequences 
posed by mistaking technological advancement for a "new" economy. Considering the 
volatility of the stock market and the economy's performance in recent months, it appears 
that the words of Bernard Baruch are still true today. This paper, then, will refrain from 
referring to today's economy as "new." 
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Traditional Business Principles 
Traditional business principles are both broad and complex. Businesses look for 
shortcuts and loopholes so that they might avoid the minute details involved with traditional 
business principles and still succeed. As the hype and perceived urgencies of the "new" 
economy began to build, that is exactly what many Internet-based businesses tried to do. In 
early 2000 though, observers began to see what they could hardly imagine. Confidence in the 
"new" economy, which had been the basis of circumventing traditional business principles, 
began to wane. 
Michael Ross, of underwear retailer Easyshop.com argued, "Companies must be built 
on fundamentally sound traditional business principles." {Internet Magazine, 2000). Though 
intimidating to a new breed of entrepreneur, traditional business principles must be applied. 
Perhaps this discussion can eliminate the intimidation factor by reducing all of the rhetoric 
and reasoning for business failures today into one definitive statement; The primary reason 
for Internet-based business failure in today's economy has been the inability of these 
businesses to proHtably provide a valuable product or service to their customers. This 
statement is made after reviewing dozens of companies that have either made a desperate 
attempt to slash their costs or have recently gone out of business (See Appendix A). 
This section will focus on the steps a business must take in order to become 
profitable. This requires a strategy based on traditional business principles, which will be 
examined in some detail throughout this discussion. The manner in which the business 
principles have evolved as a result of the Internet will also be examined. The discussion 
begins, however, by looking at the relationship between strategy and profit. 
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Strategy And Profit 
Strategy is defined as an action a company takes to attain one or more of its goals 
(Hill & Jones, 1997). For most, if not all organizations, an overriding goal is to achieve 
superior performance. Thus, a strategy can be defined more precisely as an action a company 
takes to attain superior performance (Hill & Jones, 1997). For the sake of this discussion 
performance is measured in profit, while superior performance is reflected in sustained profit. 
Profit is defined as the excess of the selling price over all costs and expenses incurred 
in making a sale (Bangs, 1998). Profitability can then be defined as the ability to make a 
profit. So how does a business make a profit? The answer to that question lies in the way 
businesses are developing and implementing profit-oriented strategies. Before strategy 
development and implementation is addressed, a discussion of how profit relates to value is 
appropriate. 
Value And Profit 
Value is what customers are willing to pay for a company's products or services 
(Besanko, 1996). However, the actual sales price of a company's products or services is 
usually below its perceived value. The difference in the perceived value of a company's 
product or service and its sales price is what economists call a consumer surplus (Besanko, 
1996). 
Consumer Surplus = Perceived Value - Sales Price 
The consumer surplus varies depending upon the competitive nature of the market. Also, the 
abundance of information about prices, competitors, and features that is readily accessible on 
the Internet has led to increasing cost transparency and consequently, to a decrease in 
consumer surpluses (Sinha, 2000). 
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A company's profit lies in the difference between the sales price of its product or 
service and the production cost of its product and service (Besanko, 1996). 
Profit = Sales Price - Production Cost 
Traditionally, the higher the value a customer places on a company's products or services, 
the higher the sales price a company can apply. Higher sales prices, provided production 
costs remain constant, result in a company earning higher profits. Additionally, a business 
could improve its profit by lowering its production costs (Besanko, 1996).' This can be 
mathematically deduced from the formula above. 
Formulas such as these can make the relationship between profit and value confusing. 
Though most businesses need only to remember that increasing sales prices or decreasing 
production costs can lead to increased profits, which is, after all, the objective of this strategy 
(See Exhibit B). Whether or not this particular objective is met depends on how the concepts 
below are used in the development of the business model. 
Strategy Development And Implementation 
One of the most common principles used by today's successful companies, whether it 
is a traditional brick and mortar store like Wal-Mart or an e-commerce trendsetter like Dell 
Computers, is the development and implementation of a well-defined strategy. This 
discussion begins by examining the steps necessary to formulate and implement an effective 
strategy and then isolates some of the concepts involved in that process. 
The basic model for developing and implementing a strategy is a five-step process: 1) 
Election of the corporate mission and major corporate goals, 2) Analysis of the 
' The statements regarding the increase in profit that result from higher perceived value or lower production 
costs are contingent upon the sales price of a company's products or services being greater than their production 
cost. 
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organization's external competitive environment to identify opportunities and threats, 3) 
Analysis of the organization's internal operating environment to identify the organization's 
strengths and weaknesses, 4) Selection of strategies that build on the organization's strengths 
and correct its weaknesses in order to take advantage of external opportunities and counter 
external threats, and 5) Strategy implementation (Hill & Jones, 1997). 
As stated, the first step in strategy formulation is to establish a corporate mission and 
subsequently define corporate goals. Since most companies want to improve their business' 
overall level of performance, this discussion will focus on the goal of achieving profitability. 
For instance, the overriding goal of Yahoo! is to achieve significant revenue and earnings 
growth. Because the company has such clear goals, it is able to formulate the strategic steps 
necessary to meet its goals (Hill & Jones, 1997). 
The Impact Of The Internet On Profit-Seeking Logic 
In the past, profitability was directly linked to market share (Slywotzky & Morrison, 
1997). Assuming the sales prices exceeded operating costs, the more units a particular 
company could sell, the more profit it would make. As a result, companies focused on 
building economies of scale, rather than on producing valuable products and services. The 
focus of companies in today's economy has since shifted away from products and towards 
customers. 
Successful companies are not blindly focused on gaining market share, but rather on 
gaining specific market share in the most profitable areas (Slywotzky & Morrison, 1997). 
Traditional profit-seeking logic was 1) Gain market share and 2) Profitability will follow. 
Today's profit-seeking logic is 1) What's most important to the customer, i.e. what do they 
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value?, 2) Can a profit be made in providing value to customers?, and 3) How can market 
share be gained in that profitable zone (Slywotzky & Morrison, 1997)? Once these questions 
are answered, the strategy begins to take shape. Next, a company identifies external 
opportunities or threats by examining its competitive advantage within its particular industry. 
Competitive Advantage 
A company is said to have gained a competitive advantage when its business' profit 
margin is higher than the industry average (Hill & Jones, 1997). Yet, achieving a competitive 
advantage is only part of the process. Sustaining a competitive advantage over a period of 
time truly sets a company apart from its competitors. 
Companies today should therefore be seeking to establish a competitive advantage 
and develop an on-going plan to sustain it. For example, Wal-Mart has had a sustained 
competitive advantage for over 20 years. Its competitive advantage has been based on 
efficient logistics, high employee productivity, and excellent customer service (Hill & Jones, 
1997). Wal-Mart's willingness to integrate new efficiency-improvement technologies into its 
business has allowed it to sustain its competitive advantage. 
Wal-Mart's ability to maintain its competitive advantage helped the company thrive 
in the early 1990's, when its competitors were struggling to keep their profits on par with the 
industry average (Hill & Jones, 1997). The concepts on which Wal-Mart's competitive 
advantage is founded are examined below. 
The Generic Building Blocks Of Competitive Advantage 
This concept is based on the premise that companies can use basic building blocks to 
establish a competitive advantage. Traditionally there have been four building blocks: 
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efficiency, quality, innovation, and customer responsiveness (Hill & Jones, 1997). Each 
building block can be used to either create value, decrease production costs, or both. 
Although these items are discussed individually, they are all interrelated. 
Efficiency 
Efficiency is the first element examined and in general terms, it can lead to a 
competitive advantage by driving down costs. If the process involved in transforming inputs 
into outputs becomes more efficient, the production costs can be driven down and a 
competitive advantage gained. Efficiency is equal to outputs divided by inputs (Hill & Jones, 
1997). Therefore, the more outputs a business can produce from a given set of inputs, the 
more efficient the business. In other words, if Company A can take ten pounds of raw 
material and produce 50 widgets and Company B can take ten pounds of raw material and 
produce 55 widgets. Company B operates more efficiently. 
Oualitv 
Quality products are goods and services that are reliable in the sense that they 
accomplish what they were designed for and do it well (Hill & Jones, 1997). If the processes 
involved in transforming inputs into outputs are examined from a quality standpoint, 
measures can be taken to assure the outputs that result are of high quality. Continuing with 
the widget example, if Company B uses higher quality raw materials and employs more 
qualified employees than does Company A, it stands to reason that the widgets produced by 
Company B will be higher in quality than the widgets produced by Company A. Company B 
can subsequently charge a higher price to offset the production costs of the higher quality 
widgets. Furthermore, lower production costs can be attained if the quality inputs used by 
Company B reduce the number of defective widgets that would otherwise be produced. Both 
22 
of these scenarios, higher sales prices and lower production costs, would increase profits (See 
Exhibit C). 
Innovation 
Innovation, the third building block, is defined as anything new or novel about the 
way a company operates or the outputs it produces (Hill & Jones, 1997). Innovation has 
always been involved when production processes are refined or new products and services 
are created. If Company B, then, refined the process of producing widgets; it could lower its 
costs and increase profits. If the company developed a newer widget that its customers 
valued more, it could raise the sales price and increase profits. Both examples result in 
Company B strengthening its competitive advantage over Company A. 
Customer Responsiveness 
The last traditional building block, but certainly not the least, is that of customer 
responsiveness. As previously mentioned, the accessibility of knowledge in the market place 
and the ease with which it can be attained has contributed to increasingly transparent costs. 
Gone are the days when companies could set sales prices drastically higher than production 
costs (Sinha, 2000). Because sales price is no longer the differentiating force that it once was, 
the intangible qualities that profits depend on now lie in the realm of customer 
responsiveness. 
To demonstrate. Company B may no longer be able to sustain its competitive 
advantage over Company A because it may no longer be able to charge a significantly higher 
price for its widgets simply because they are higher quality. This would pose a serious 
problem for Company B because it uses higher quality materials and provides its employees 
with more training than does Company A, thus its production costs are relatively higher. 
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Therefore, in addition to providing a higher quality widget, Company B can also use superior 
customer responsiveness to increase the perceived value of its widgets. The company could 
then continue to demand a higher sales price and offset the expenses attributed to the higher 
level of customer responsiveness. This is especially important if Company B intends to 
sustain its competitive advantage. 
Again, note that the four building blocks are interrelated. The ability of Company B 
to integrate the efficiency, quality, innovation, and customer responsiveness building blocks 
could lead to lower unit costs and higher unit prices (See Exhibit D). A significant 
competitive advantage over Company A would be gained as a result. 
On the other hand, suppose that despite all Company B has done to gain a competitive 
advantage, customers still prefer doing business with Company A. Why? It is possible that 
the four traditional building blocks are not enough to ensure a competitive advantage in 
today's economy. This discussion proposes that two additional building blocks must be taken 
into consideration for a business in today's economy to establish and sustain a competitive 
advantage. The two new building blocks are: lock-in and complementarities. 
Lock-In 
Lock-in refers to the ability of a business to attract repeat customers. It can result by 
establishing switching costs that customers face if they were to switch to a different provider 
(Amit & Zott, 2000). If a customer perceives a switching cost, then a company can increase 
prices for the products or services it sells. On the Internet, switching costs are created by 
providing transaction safety and creating the perception of trust, through familiarity with the 
site, and also through customization and personalization. One simple example of a company 
that uses lock-in effectively is Amazon.com. Amazon has developed features like its "one-
24 
click ordering system" that make it easier for customers to complete e-commerce transactions 
{Marketing News, 2000). This ease of use, as well as Amazon's ability to personalize its 
website to better meet its customers' needs, effectively locks-in buyers who return for more 
purchases. 
Complementarities 
The second new building block is that of complementarities. Companies have long 
known that they can leverage the value of their own products by bundling them with 
complementary products from other suppliers. On the Internet, bundling complementary 
products or services together is crucial because it helps to establish and sustain a competitive 
advantage (Amit & Zott, 2000). For instance, if Company B markets its e-widgets with 
Company C's e-widget accessory services, the combined value of the two products could be 
greater than the value of the individual products alone. The higher combined value which 
results allows for increased sales prices. 
These additional building blocks can help make the traditional generic building 
blocks more applicable in today's economy. Furthermore, businesses today should note that 
all of the building blocks discussed are generic and thus general in nature. As is discussed 
later in this section, well-defined strategies are necessary for companies to succeed. 
Up to this point in the strategic planning process, the focus has been external. Ways 
in which a company can gauge its position in the market and improve customers' perception 
have been considered. The next stage of the strategy development process involves looking 
inside a company's organization and identifying the processes involved in delivering value to 
customers. 
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The Value Chain 
The term value chain refers to a company's chain of activities that transform inputs 
into outputs that customers consider valuable (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997). This is a 
strategic concept that businesses can use to further establish or develop their competitive 
advantage and to maximize profit. Traditionally the value chain begins with the company's 
core competencies and its assets. It then moves to inputs and other raw materials, to a product 
or an offering, to the distribution channels, and finally to the customer (See Exhibit E). The 
Internet is challenging the traditional application of this process, which results from the 
"product first and customer second" mode of thinking, which is referred to as product-centric 
thinking (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997). 
The Internet has shifted the balance of power away from businesses and towards 
customers. This fundamental shift has altered the way in which the value chain concept 
might be used today. Rather than starting with a company's core competencies and working 
towards delivering a product or service to a customer, it is more relevant to start with 
customers' needs and work backwards toward a company's core competencies. The 
"customer first and product second" mode of thinking is referred to as customer-centric 
thinking (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997). A comparison of the product-centric value chain 
and customer-centric value chain is illustrated in Exhibit E. 
Customer-Centric Thinking 
This discussion does not infer that the value chain concept is irrelevant in today's 
economy. On the contrary, the value chain is a powerful tool, though this discussion argues 
that it be viewed in a customer-centric light. Consider customer-centric thinking as a way of 
focusing on the future and not on the past. It involves deciphering what a customer's top two 
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or three priorities are likely to be and then designing a product or service with those specific 
priorities in mind (Slywotsky & Morrison, 1997). 
Clearly, if a product is developed specifically with a customer group's needs in mind, 
those customers will value that product more and be willing to pay more to acquire it. If 
Company B designed a customer-centric product it would have a definite advantage over 
Company A. Furthermore, if customers value Company B's product more than Company A's 
product. Company B could assign a higher sales price to its product. This would increase 
Company B's profit and thus establish a competitive advantage over Company A. 
Up to this point in the strategic planning process, an objective has been set, desirable 
markets and customers have been identified, competitive advantages in those markets have 
been addressed, and the processes involved in delivering value to desirable customers have 
been defined. At this point in the development process, a company is ready to focus on its 
business model. 
The Business Model 
As has been discussed throughout this paper, the underlying premise of the traditional 
business principles is the same. However, the ways in which fundamental business concepts 
are applied has evolved since the advent of the Internet. The business model is one such 
concept. A business model can be defined as all of the Internet- and non-Intemet-related 
processes involved in delivering value to a customer (Afuah & Tucci, 2000). Although it is 
part of the business model, revenue generation is a model in itself. The revenue model 
refers to the specific ways in which a business model enables revenue generation. 
To clarify, a business model describes the ways in which a company interacts with its 
partners, suppliers, and employees to create value for its customers. A revenue model centers 
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on the methods in which revenues can be realized, such as subscription fees, advertising fees, 
or e-commerce transactions. The revenue model and its relationship with a business model's 
cost structure are now examined. 
The Revenue Model And The Cost Structure 
Before an effective revenue model can be designed, an understanding of the existing 
cost structure is necessary. After all, if the costs of producing a particular product are 
unknown, how can an efficient revenue model be developed? Fortunately the strategy 
development portion of this process can provide some insight. 
In order to accurately define the cost structure, the cost of each process included in 
the business model must be determined. Accurately allocating costs to those processes is not 
an easy task. While it is fairly simple to assign a cost to raw materials or direct labor, precise 
costing of a process like research and development or marketing is more challenging. 
Costs indirectly associated with a production unit are called overhead costs 
(Zimmerman, 1999). A variety of overhead allocation methods can be used; however, those 
methods are beyond the scope of this paper. Generally speaking overhead allocation methods 
allow a business to account for all costs on a per unit basis. Analyzing the existing cost 
structure and viewing it in a cost per process manner can provide a company with a deeper 
understanding of its business model. 
Once production costs are accurately gauged, then and only then can an accurate 
pricing decision be made. APBNews is a good example of a company whose business model 
was adept at producing valuable content, but whose revenue model was inept at producing 
sufficient revenue. Had the executives at APBNews taken the time to examine their internal 
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processes and the costs involved in producing their content, they could have either taken a 
slower growth strategy or aggressively refined their revenue model to offset their 
expenditures. 
The process of defining a company's cost structure also helps establish a floor, or a 
lower limit for the price a company should charge for its product or service. Conversely, 
market conditions, along with price transparency and other issues, help determine the ceiling, 
or the upper limit. These are crucial pieces of information when developing a revenue model. 
If the business processes are accurately defined and costs are assigned accordingly, 
the revenue model is likely to be far more effective. An effective revenue model combined 
with the concepts previously discussed in this section will result in a truly solid business 
model that does two things: 1) Provides customers a valuable product or service and 2) 
Provides business owner(s) revenues that are likely to exceed productions costs. The 
remainder of this section will examine how the Internet has influenced the processes 
involved in developing a business model. 
The Impact Of The Internet On Business Models 
Three basic strategies for structuring business models to create superior value exist: 
1) Differentiation - a business model is structured in such a way that it produces a product or 
service that consumers value more and are prepared to pay a premium price for, 2) Low-cost 
leader - a business model is structured to drive down the production costs and produce a 
product or service priced below its competition, and 3) A combination of the two strategies 
(Porter, 1985). Before selecting a strategy, it may be useful for companies to identify the 
major components of their current and future business models and identify how the Internet 
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is likely to impact each component. Several business model components, along with 
questions that address the impact of the Internet on those components, are considered in the 
table below. 
Table 1 - The Impact of the Internet on Business Model Components 
Component 4. -« . Questions for of Business , , , All Business Models Model 
Generic Is the firm offering its customers 
strategy something distinctive or at a lower cost 
than its competitors? 
Desirable To which customers (demographic and 
customers geographic) is the firm offering this value? 
What is the range of products/services 
offered that embody this value? 
Pricing decision How does the firm price the value? 
Revenue model 
Questions Specific to 
Internet Business Models 
What is it about the Internet that allows a 
firm to offer its customers something 
distinctive? Can the Internet allow a firm to 
solve a new set of problems for customers? 
What is the scope of customers that the 
Internet enables a firm to reach? Does the 
Internet alter the product or service mix that 
embodies the firm's products? 
How does the Internet make pricing 
different? 
Are revenue sources different with the 
Internet? What is new? 
Where do the dollars come from? Who 
pays for what value and when? What are 
the margins in each market and what 
drives them? What drives value in each 
source? 
What set of activities does the firm have to 
perform to offer this value and when? How 
connected (in cross-section and time) are 
these activities? 
What organizational structure, systems, 
people, and environment does the firm 
need to carry out these activities? What is 
the fit between them? 
What is it about the firm that makes it 
difficult for other firms to imitate it? How 
does the firm keep making money? How 
does the firm sustain its competitive 
advantage? 
Source: Afuah, Allan & Tucci, Christopher L. (2000). Internet Business Models and Strategies. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education. 
Internet and 
non-Internet 
related 
activities 
Implementation 
Sustainability 
How many new activities must be 
performed because of the Internet? How 
much better can the Internet help a firm to 
perform existing activities? 
What does the Internet do to the strategy, 
structure, systems, people, and environment 
of a firm? 
Does the Internet make sustainability easier 
or more difficult? How can a firm take 
advantage of it? 
Key Characteristics Of Internet Business Models 
In order for business models to be just as beneficial in today's dynamic economy as 
they were in the past, it is recommended that they include three key characteristics: 1) 
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Scalability, 2) Complementary resources and capabilities, and 3) Knowledge-sharing routines 
(Ethiraj, 2000). 
Scalability 
Scalability can be defined as how well a solution to some problem will work when a 
variable of that problem - demand for example - increases (Hill & Jones, 1997). Business 
models in today's economy must be scalable to respond to such changes in the technological 
environment in which they operate. Because they were scalable, companies like Yahoo! and 
e-Bay were able to innovatively leverage their first mover advantage and quickly capture a 
dominant share of their respective markets. The scalability of those companies' business 
models enabled them to exploit opportunities offered by the Web. If companies want the 
ability to exploit Internet-related opportunities as Yahoo! and e-Bay did, they must develop 
business models that are scalable. 
Complementary Resources And Capabilities 
As previously mentioned, a company with an innovative business model can initially 
use its technological superiority to establish a competitive advantage. It is a mistake, 
however, to believe that a technological advantage in today's business environment is a long-
term proposition. Technological innovation, which dominates the e-business world, has a 
unique attribute. It is generally difficult to produce in the first place, but once produced, it is 
comparatively easy to reproduce (Ethiraj, 2000). 
This attribute sharply lowers technological barriers to entry and allows rivals to catch 
up with first movers in a relatively short period of time. Yahoo! is a good example of this. 
Although Yahoo! was the first portal to market, there were no real barriers to entry so 
competitors like AltaVista.com and Excite.com quickly followed suit. Yahoo! had to develop 
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and acquire additional complementary resources and services to sustain its first mover 
advantage. Had Yahoo! not had that capability it would almost surely not be as popular as it 
is today. 
Knowledge-Sharing Routines 
Whether it is Microsoft or America On-Line, no individual firm can dominate the 
Internet. In fact, the Internet's open architectural design was specifically created to avoid 
such dominance. As a result, networks of alliances have become increasingly important. 
Businesses today must recognize that competitive advantage in the post-Intemet economy is 
often based on effectively managing collaborative relationships with key partners, like 
suppliers or distributors. Thus the need for strong collaborative relationships arises. These 
cooperative relationships can only become truly effective if the collaborators develop 
mechanisms through which they can mutually share knowledge. Such knowledge-sharing 
relationships will enhance the participating businesses' collective competitive advantage. 
The elements of scalability, complementary resources and capabilities, and 
knowledge-sharing routines are not necessarily new. Yet, their degree of importance to the 
success of a business model is. Companies operating in today's economy can strengthen their 
competitive advantages by incorporating these characteristics into their business models. 
Discussion Summary 
The primary focus of this section was developing a strategy based on traditional 
business principles that results in a fundamentally sound business model. Concepts involved 
in the development and implementation process were examined throughout the discussion. 
Effects of the Internet on the application of these concepts were also analyzed. Value's 
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relationships to strategy and profit served as the foundation for developing and implementing 
the strategy. 
The five-step process that followed that analysis served as the framework for the 
remainder of the discussion. The model illustrated in Exhibit F is based on the five steps of 
that process. The first stage of the model is that of clarification. In this stage a company 
narrows the focus of its potential business model by defining specific goals. The way in 
which the Internet has affected the process of identifying markets and customers was 
addressed in that portion of the discussion. As the company focuses externally on 
competitive markets, and especially on potential customers it hopes to serve, the model 
transitions into its second phase. 
In stage two, a company focuses on the external opportunities and threats that exist 
for its business. The generic building blocks of competitive advantage used in that discussion 
evaluate a company's position within its marketplace. They also further establish the 
direction of the company. Additionally, two new building blocks - lock-in and 
complementarities - were proposed. For a company to gauge its market position it must have 
a good understanding of its internal business processes. The need for an internal analysis 
leads to stage three. 
In stage three, internal focus, business processes and their interdependent 
relationships are defined. The value chain concept was used to facilitate the internal analysis. 
Customer-centric thinking was introduced and the vantage point of the traditional value chain 
challenged. 
As a result of the new vantage point, it was argued that a company could better 
identify and assign costs to both value producing and non-value producing business 
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processes. This results in a well-defined cost structure, which was identified as being an 
integral part of a solid business model. The appreciation gained through using the value chain 
to identify business processes and then to allocate costs provides invaluable insights that 
carry over into stages four and five of the model. 
In stage four, the new business model is conceptually constructed. Business processes 
are theoretically adapted to maximize value-producing efforts and to minimize costs. In an 
effort to drive down costs, value-producing business processes can be refined, while non-
value-producing business processes can be phased out wherever possible. The well-defined 
cost structure will facilitate the development of a truly efficient revenue model. After all, a 
well-defined cost structure and an efficient revenue model, combined with the previous 
concepts covered throughout this discussion, will result in a truly solid business model. Stage 
five then involves identifying and implementing the changes necessary to bring the existing 
business model in line with the conceptual business model. 
Finally, although the model is divided and ordered into five succinct stages, the 
model is actually perpetual. In today's dynamic economy, the only thing that is constant is 
change. As such, all companies must be willing to adapt their businesses to the changes they 
will inevitably face. 
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Traditional Business Principles Applied In Today's Economy 
This discussion will look at how the traditional business principles have been used by 
one of the most recognizable companies today - Priceline.com. The discussion begins by 
looking at the history of Priceline and then defining the company, as it exists today, by 
examining likely causes for its recent decline. Finally, the model for strategy development 
and implementation will be applied to the context of Priceline's evolution. It should be noted 
the Priceline discussion in this section is retrospective and based on secondary data. The 
intent was to illustrate the conceptual model in a specific context rather than to suggest either 
effective or ineffective management on the part of Priceline. 
The History Of Priceline.Com 
Jay Walker founded Priceline.com on July 18,1997. The company was based on a 
concept developed and patented by Walker Digital Inc. known as the "demand collection 
system" (Priceline, 2000). The demand collection system is detailed later. 
Priceline launched its website on April 6,1998 with its first service, airline ticket 
reservations and the following October expanded to include hotel rooms (Priceline, 2000). In 
January of 1999, Priceline underwent horizontal integration of its services when it began 
offering customers a mortgage-bidding service (Priceline, 2000). Thus, Priceline entered the 
financial services industry. Priceline went public on March 30,1999 and used the $160 
million it raised to further horizontal integration into other industries (Priceline, 2(X)0). The 
following July the company teamed up with AutoNation Inc. to offer an Internet car-buying 
service (Priceline, 2000). 
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In the fall of 1999, a portion of Priceline's capital was invested in another Walker-
founded company, Priceline WebHouse Club. The demand collection system was licensed to 
Priceline WebHouse for the sale of groceries and the new company was incorporated directly 
into Priceline's website. Later that fall Priceline expanded into yet another industry with the 
addition of international and domestic long distance phone service (Priceline, 2000). 
The announcements kept coming the following year and in February 2000, rental car 
reservations were added to Priceline's list of offerings. In June, while gasoline prices were 
soaring, Priceline WebHouse announced that it would allow users to name their own price on 
gasoline. At its peak, a customer visiting Priceline.com could "name their own price" on 
plane tickets, hotel rooms, rental cars, domestic and international long distance service, home 
financing, groceries, new and used cars, and finally gasoline. Gasoline, however, proved to 
be the last major addition for Priceline. 
In September 2000, Priceline warned that its third quarter earnings would be in the 
range of $340 million to $345 million, significantly lower than analysts' estimates of $360 
million to $380 million (Priceline, 2000). Later that October, Priceline WebHouse announced 
plans to wind down operations over the next 90 days and immediately lay off 40 of its 425 
member staff (See Exhibit G). Remaining employees were to be let go during the following 
months (Fendelman, 2000). Priceline WebHouse officials said that they would not be able to 
raise a third round of financing required to complete the business plan and achieve 
profitability (Fendelman, 2000). 
That announcement had a particularly negative effect on Priceline because it recorded 
a $189 million non-cash gain in the fourth quarter of 1999 from a warrant it received in 
Priceline WebHouse. As a result of the closure, Priceline was forced to take a non-cash loss 
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Table 2 - Timeline of Events in the History of Priceline.com 
7/18/1997.. . Priceline is founded 
4/6/1998.. . Priceline launched its website with its first service, airline ticket reservations 
8/27/1998.. . Richard S. Braddock is named Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
10/28/1998.. . Hotel rooms reservations are added to Priceline's offerings 
1/25/1999.. . Priceline entered the home finance industry and provided its customers the opportunity to 
name their own rate and terms for mortgages 
3/29/1999.. . Priceline priced IPO at $16 per share went public the following day 
6/17/1999.. . Daniel H. Schulman, former President of AT&T's Consumer Markets Division, is named as 
Priceline's new President and Chief Operating Officer 
7/1/1999.. . Maryann Keller is named President of Priceline's Automotive Services Unit 
7/27/1999.. . Priceline and AutoNation, Inc. announced their plans to offer a name-your-own-price new 
vehicle service 
11/1/1999.. . Priceline WebHouse Club's website is launched 
11/8/1999 . . Priceline entered the telecommunications industry by expanding its business offerings to 
include International and Domestic Long Distance Service 
2/3/2000.. . Priceline expanded its offerings to allow its users to name their own price for car rental 
reservations 
2/23/2000.. . Heidi Miller, Former CFO of Citigroup, joined Priceline.com as its Senior Executive Vice 
President, CFO and Member of the Board Of Directors 
4/4/2000.. . William F. Pike joined Priceline as Vice President in charge of Financial Planning & 
Analysis and Investor Relations 
6/20/2000.. . Priceline announced the addition of gasoline to WebHouse Club 
10/5/2000.. . Priceline WebHouse Club announced the 90-day wind-down of its name-your-price grocery 
and gasoline Internet service 
11/1/2000.. . Priceline announced plans to layoff approximately 87 employees 
11/8/2000.. . Heidi Miller and Maryann Keller leave Priceline after the layoffs were announced, stock 
price fell 23 percent on the report of the executives departures 
12/7/2000.. . Priceline.com eliminated approximately 11 percent of its workforce 
12/28/2000.. . Jay Walker stepped down from Priceline's Board of Directors 
Source: Priceline.com Press Releases 
http://www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhttnl ?ticker=pcln&script=400 
for the full $189 million carrying value of the warrant in the third-quarter of 2000 
(Fendelman, 2000). This did not sit well with investors and its already falling stock price 
continued to plunge. As profitability became a more pressing issue in the minds of investors, 
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the viability of Priceline's demand collection system was called into question. In an effort to 
make Priceline profitable, considerable steps were taken to reduce expenditures. 
Early in November 2000, Priceline announced plans to lay off 87 of its 535 
employees (Priceline, 2000). This led to more setbacks later that month when two Priceline 
executives left as a result of the cutbacks. Maryann Keller, who headed Priceline's auto-
services business, left the company after she was asked to lay off half of her 23-person staff 
(Loomis, 2000). When asked about her departure, she publicly declared Priceline's on-line 
car buying venture a failure (Anqwin & Lundegaard, 2000). That same week Chief Financial 
Officer Heidi Miller also left, though her reasons for leaving were not disclosed (Krebs, 
2000). 
The layoffs and departures continued to have a detrimental effect on Priceline's stock 
price. On November 13, 2000, just eight months after reaching a record high of $106.63 per 
share, its stock price fell to an all-time low of $2.13 per share (The Wall Street Journal, 
2000). The table on the previous page summarizes these events. The next portion of this 
discussion will hypothesize on possible reasons for Priceline's diminishing market value. 
Possible Reasons For Priceline's Current Status 
Priceline's diminishing value can be attributed to two likely reasons: 1) Making 
Priceline successful is not Jay Walker's primary objective and 2) The demand collection 
system on which Priceline is founded is not efficient. The statement involving Mr. Walker's 
objectives is examined first. 
Priceline does not provide a publicly disclosed mission statement. As such, no clear 
company objectives can be identified. From an outsider's point of view, however, one might 
ascertain from the number of horizontal expansions made by Priceline that its primary 
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unofficial objective has been to expand into as many markets as possible. A likely reason for 
the seemingly indiscriminate expansion of Priceline is the fact that Jay Walker has more of a 
vested interest in the success of the demand collection system than he does in Priceline itself. 
This is because Walker Digital, Inc. holds the patent rights to the pricing system used 
by Priceline. Consequently, the more markets the demand collection system is viable in, the 
more valuable the patent becomes for Walker Digital, Inc. So it seems that instead of Mr. 
Walker using the demand collection system to make Priceline successful, just the opposite 
holds true. The possibility that the success of Priceline was a secondary concern for Mr. 
Walker would contribute to its present status. 
The second likely reason for the present status of Priceline is the inefficient nature of 
the demand collection system, used in some form or another to sell all of Priceline's services. 
Technologically speaking the processes that make up Priceline's pricing system are rather 
complex, although the concept is quite simple. Since the majority of Priceline's revenues 
come from the sale of airline tickets, they will be used to illustrate how the system actually 
works. 
The process actually began when Priceline negotiated with participating carriers for 
access to unsold seats at special prices. Unfortunately for Priceline, Mr. Walker did not have 
a great deal of leverage during early negotiations. As a result, Priceline is limited to the 
tickets and the prices the airlines decide upon. Also, the tickets provided by the airlines are 
generally for seats they would not be able to sell otherwise. 
Once the pool of tickets is assigned to Priceline the ticket prices, which the airlines 
(not Priceline) may revise as often as they like, are entered into a database. When a bid is 
submitted, computers check whether a match is available and the bidder is notified via e-mail 
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20 to 30 minutes later with a response. This means that a bid is filled only if it meets or 
exceeds a price that is previously set by one of Priceline's partner airlines. So while it is true 
that consumers can "name" prices at Priceline, it is still the airlines that determine whether or 
not those prices are acceptable. Also, Priceline does not publish the prices of its available 
tickets and consumers tend to pay more than the undisclosed prices set by the airlines 
(Elkind, 1999). 
Still, the value that results from this business model lies in the customer's perception 
of control, i.e. naming their own price. Although the number of concessions a customer must 
make in order to do business with Priceline arguably diminishes that value. For instance, here 
are just a.few of the concessions passengers must be willing to make in order to purchase a 
ticket from Priceline. Customers must be willing to: 1) Fly any airline, 2) Depart at any time 
after 6 a.m. and land anytime before 10 p.m., 3) Accept coach class seats that are not eligible 
for frequent flier miles or upgrades, and 4) Agree that all accepted bids cannot be changed 
and are non-refundable. So not only are customers not getting the lowest price available, they 
are also forced to make concessions. 
This turns out to be a fairly inefficient way of selling airline tickets. The ratio of 
submitted bids to accepted bids attests to this fact. In 1999 only 24 percent of all the bids 
submitted to Priceline were actually filled. As poor as that number sounds, it was an increase 
of 17 percent over 1998's seven percent fill rate (Elkind, 1999). This means that in 1998 
Priceline was unable to satisfy approximately 75 percent of the bids that were submitted. 
Furthermore, it often takes several attempts before a bid is finally accepted because a specific 
itinerary can usually be submitted only once. Recall that it takes 20 to 30 minutes before 
customers know whether or not their bids were accepted, which can also make the process 
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very time consuming. The next portion of this discussion focuses on how the strategy 
development and implementation model introduced in the previous section could be applied 
to Priceline's situation. 
Application Of The Strategy Development And Implementation Model 
Stage One - Clarification 
As previously stated, Priceline does not have a publicized mission statement or a list 
of strategic objectives. That is not to say that one does not exist; however, for this discussion 
it is assumed that Priceline is in need of a clearly defined corporate goal. Although Priceline 
may have many strategic objectives - for example to sell a certain number of tickets, to 
improve its fulfillment rates, or to earn a profit - none qualify as a corporate goal. Within the 
context of this model, corporate goals are long-term and specific. 
For instance, if expansion were the corporate goal of a particular company, that 
company v/ould likely focus on expanding into specific industries and markets in which it 
has a core competence. Priceline, on the other hand, underwent significant horizontal 
integration into industries in which it did not appear to have any obvious core competencies 
or previous experience. In retrospect those expansions may not have been the most ideal for 
Priceline. Unfortunately there is not an opportunity to examine the relevancy of those choices 
in the context of a public mission statement or its subsequent goals. This relevance and the 
importance of such goals are examined next. 
If one viewed Priceline as a giant ocean-going ship, it would be easy to see the need 
for forward thinking and specificity. Ships that size cannot be maneuvered very easily, nor 
can they sail aimlessly for an indefinite period of time. Before setting sail, they first need a 
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specific destination so that the best course can be plotted, the appropriate personnel hired, 
and the necessary supplies brought aboard. 
Just as a ship's destination cannot be vague, neither can a company's corporate goal. 
Therefore, while becoming profitable is an excellent objective for Priceline, it is not a 
suitable corporate goal. In fact, solely focusing on profitability could be detrimental to 
Priceline's long-term success. To avoid conflicts between short-term and long-term goals, 
Priceline's specific corporate goal should be to maximize the current value per share of its 
existing stock. 
This goal is based on the assumption that investors purchase stock because they seek 
to gain financially (Ross, 1996). Therefore a company's decision could be categorized as 
either positive or negative based on the likely effect the decision would have on the 
company's stock price. It follows that Priceline should act in its shareholders' best interests 
by making decisions that increase the fundamental value of the company, which in turn 
would increase the value of its stock. Specific strategic objectives that could have such an 
effect on Priceline will be discussed in stage three. For now, the corporate goal has been 
selected and the model transitions onto stage two. 
Stage Two - External Focus 
In stage two, one of external focus, a company first identifies its target markets and 
ideal customers within those markets. To continue with the ship example, a decision needs to 
be made as to what cargo will be carried. After all, a ship designed to carry freight is much 
different than a ship designed to carry people. Once the cargo is selected, further distinctions 
must be made as to what type of freight or passengers the ship carries. The more information 
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that can be attained before a ship sets sail, the more accommodating the ship can be for its 
cargo. 
For the sake of this discussion, Priceline should narrow the scope of its offerings to 
services within the travel industry. Its ideal customers are price-conscious travelers who need 
reservations and acconmiodations on short notice. Therefore, the ideal customers for 
Priceline are business and leisure travelers seeking accommodations on short notice and at 
bargain prices. Conversely, Priceline should not be actively seeking travelers who may have 
airline, class, or frequent-flier preferences. With a target market identified and ideal 
customers defined, it is important to determine how Priceline compares relative to its 
competition. 
Although Priceline was an early entrant in the on-line segment of the travel industry, 
competitors quickly gained ground. In fact, later entrants have the benefit of learning from 
their predecessors. For example, Hotwire.com, a recent entrant in the on-line travel market, 
promises to deliver deep discounts just like Priceline does, only with a more user-friendly 
system (Merrick, 2000). 
Hotwire is an excellent example of a service designed in a customer-centric fashion. 
This system takes much of the work out of the customers' hands. Instead of having to devise 
and submit multiple itineraries, as Priceline.com requires, Hotwire.com requires an itinerary 
be devised and submitted only once. Hotwire then takes the itinerary and provides a list of 
available flights according to customer preferences with regard to specific airports, number 
of connections, or lowest prices. Finally, the customer has 30 minutes to decide whether to 
purchase one of the available tickets at the price listed by Hotwire (Merrick, 2000). 
The customer-centric focus and the fact that Hotwire actually publishes its prices are 
serious concerns for Priceline considering they share common sources of airline tickets. In 
fact, many major airlines that supply Priceline are direct investors in Hotwire. This poses a 
serious threat to Priceline's ability to sustain a competitive advantage, which is examined as 
the model begins to transition onto the third stage of internal focus. 
Stage Three - Internal Focus 
A closer look at how Priceline is currently using the competitive advantage building 
blocks can provide some insight as to what objectives might help Priceline improve upon its 
position in the on-line travel market. For instance, the demand collection system on which 
Priceline is founded is still relatively innovative. In fact, allowing consumers to "name their 
own price" may be one of the most important sources of Priceline's competitive advantage. 
The innovation building block could be considered strong as a result. 
Priceline has further developed its competitive advantage by strengthening the lock-in 
building block. Much like Amazon, Priceline allows users to create a profile that tracks the 
areas visited and the purchases made by each user. It then uses that information to make 
customized recommendations the next time that user visits Priceline.com. 
Priceline also offers a variety of services that complement its airline-ticket offerings. 
The ability of travelers to make hotel and car rental reservations when they make airline 
reservations strengthens the complementarities building block. However, some of the 
services offered by Priceline add no value to its core travel-related services. Because these 
non-value adding services consume valuable resources, they diminish the strength of this 
building block and the overall competitive advantage of the company. 
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Unfortunately the quality of the services offered by Priceline could be considered low 
- so low that more than 300 complaints have been filed against Priceline with The 
Connecticut Better Business Bureau and government regulatory agencies since 1998 (Schaal, 
2000). In September 2000, the bureau rescinded Priceline's membership because of the 
numerous complaints filed against the company; though the company has since been 
reinstated (Schaal, 2000). Numerous complaints, along with the low percentage of bids 
actually filled by Priceline, are indicators that Priceline's quality, efficiency, and customer 
responsiveness building blocks are weak. 
The competitive advantage building blocks provide the necessary insight to 
approximate Priceline's position in the market. To further enhance this insight and move 
closer to its goal of maximizing the value of its stock, Priceline needs a better understanding 
of how its internal processes interrelate with the competitive advantage building blocks. 
After all, improving the quality and efficiency of its internal processes would drive down 
costs and, if done correctly, could help to increase the percentage of completed bids and 
value delivered to its customers. In fact, these objectives are becoming more and more 
important as competition in the on-line travel market increases. 
In January 2001 Expedia and Travelocity announced improvements to their on-line 
services (Davis, 2001). Expedia rolled out "Expert Searching and Pricing," a new platform 
the company says will allow its customers to choose from an average of 400 itinerary 
combinations for each round-trip domestic air ticket search. Travelocity's new fare-search 
technology will show consumers when to travel to get the lowest airfare. The fact that both 
companies made their announcements on the same day illustrates the competitive nature of 
the on-line travel market and the importance of providing ever-increasing value to customers. 
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Driving down costs and increasing sales volumes are two ways in which Priceline is 
most likely to achieve its corporate goal of maximizing the value of its stock. Recall that 
raising or lowering its prices are not options for Priceline because its suppliers determine the 
price floor and its customers determine the price ceiling. Therefore if Priceline wants to 
meets its goal and also become profitable it must focus internally on two strategic objectives: 
1) Improving the quality and efficiency of the demand collection system and 2) Streamlining 
the cost structure. 
Accomplishing these two objectives can be aided through the use of the value chain 
concepts (See Exhibit E). These concepts can be used to identify the processes that make up 
Priceline's current business model. Once identified, each process must be further reduced to 
specific activities, examined, and then defined. The definition should establish whether a 
process contributes value and quantify the costs it consumes. 
Determining whether a particular process produces value and gauging its cost are 
tedious tasks. The effort required, however, should not deter Priceline, or any company for 
that matter, from clearly defining its business processes. The definitions provide insight into 
the efficiency and the necessity of individual business processes, which are vital pieces of 
information in stage four, construction. 
Stage Four - Construction 
In this stage, information gathered from the three previous stages is used to 
theoretically refine each business process and to construct a conceptual business model. 
Priceline's processes need to be refined to produce the most value and consume the fewest 
resources possible. Care must be taken to assure the two objectives discussed in stage three 
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are adequately addressed and that Priceline is closer to its ultimate goal as a result of the 
changes. 
This stage is also a tedious one because it involves identifying specific activities 
within specific business processes that can be either improved upon or eliminated altogether. 
The end result of this stage is the ideal business model for Priceline based upon the decisions 
made and information gathered in the three previous stages. The next stage involves 
implementing the necessary changes. 
Stage Five - Implementation 
The objective of stage five is to minimize the differences between the ideal business 
model and the existing business model. When an implementation plan is developed, care 
must be taken so that employee or consumer confidence is not affected in a negative way. 
Employees could resist the changes being made or consumers could consider the product or 
service less valuable if the plan is not implemented in a thoughtful manner. 
In Priceline's case the implementation plan would almost certainly involve modifying 
certain processes, eliminating some of its services, and ultimately further reducing its 
workforce. Changes like these have the potential to make Priceline appear to be in a worse 
situation than it actually is. Consequently, internal and external reactions should be 
thoroughly considered when the implementation plan is developed and carefully monitored 
when the existing business model is brought in line with the conceptual business model. 
Comments About The Strategy Development And Implementation Model 
The perpetual nature of this model requires that Priceline continually progress 
through the five stages of the model. This means that once Priceline implements the changes 
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necessary to bring its current business model in line with its ideal business model, it must 
begin anew to reevaluate its corporate goals and strategic objectives. Priceline must make 
sure the direction of the company coincides with current market conditions if it hopes to 
sustain its competitive advantage. This will undoubtedly result in Priceline perpetually 
refining its business model to assure continual movement towards its corporate goal. 
CheapTickets And Priceline.Com 
To further demonstrate how a closer adherence to traditional business principles 
would benefit Priceline, this section of the discussion compares Priceline's performance with 
that of a competitor who has adhered to traditional business principles. The competitor for 
this analysis is CheapTickets, which was co-founded in 1986 by Chairman Michael Hartley 
and his wife (Elkind, 1999). The company sells airline tickets primarily by phone and on the 
Internet, as well as through its 12 retail outlets. Thus, CheapTickets is not an Internet pure 
player. Despite this fact, CheapTickets strives to serve many of the same customers as 
Priceline and is subject to the same economic and market conditions. For the purposes of this 
discussion, these factors make CheapTickets suitable for comparison. 
Even though CheapTickets was established nearly 12 years before Priceline, it is not 
nearly as well known. The reason for its relative obscurity is because Mr. Hartley specifically 
chose not to invest in developing his brand as Mr. Walker did. CheapTickets was committed 
to earning a profit, but could not afford to advertise like Priceline (Elkind, 1999). "My hat's 
off to Jay [Walker]," said Mr. Hartley in a 1999 interview. "He's created a national brand in a 
very short period. I think I could've done the same if I spent the money he did on advertising. 
But then, we've got a policy here at CheapTickets: We need to make money." (Elkind, 1999). 
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Over time, the decision not to invest heavily in brand development was profitable for 
CheapTickets. In 1999 it racked up a comparable number of airline tickets sales and 
generated comparable revenues (See Table Below). More importantly CheapTickets reported 
a net income of $7.6 million for the fiscal year ending 1999 compared to Priceline's Net Loss 
of $1,055 billion (See Table Below). 
Table 3 - Financial Comparison of CheapTickets and Priceline 
CheaoTickets, Inc. 
NASDAQ: CTIX 
Fiscal Year-End: December 
Priceline.com, Inc. 
NASDAQ: PC LN 
Fiscal \ ear-End: December 
1999 Sales (mil.): $339.6 
1-Yr. Sales Growth: 98.5% 
2000 Sales (mil.): $98.4 
l-Yr. Sales Growth: (71.07r) 
1999 Sales (mil.): $482.4 
l-\ r. Sales (irowth: 1270.5% 
2000 Sales (mil.): $1,235.0 
1-^ r. Sales (irowth: 156.0% 
1999 Net Inc. (mil.): $7.6 
1-Yr. Net Inc. Cirowth: 590.9% 
2000 Net Inc. (mil.): $12.0 
1-Yr. Net Inc. Growth: 57.97r 
1999 Net Inc. (mil.): ($1,055.1) 
\-\r. Net Inc. (irowth: N/A 
2000 Net Inc. (mil.): ($330.0) 
l-\'r. Net Inc. Growth: N/A 
1999 Employees: 953 
1-Yr. Employee Growth: 61.5% 
1999 Employees: 373 
1-Yr. Employee Growth: 164.5% 
Source: Hoover's On-line: http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/3/0,2163,59003,OO.html (CheapTickets) 
http://www.hoovers.com/co/capsule/7/0,2163,58847,00.html (Priceline) 
This paper argues that the drastically different bottom lines are a direct result of the 
drastically different ways in which the two companies applied traditional business principles. 
First and foremost, CheapTickets made making money a priority. Second, Mr. Hartley 
understood the cost structure of CheapTickets in relation to its revenue model. This is evident 
by examining the performance of the company over the last year. Despite its sales falling 71 
percent in 2000, its net income actually increased 51 percent. This performance is a direct 
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result of Mr. Hartley's understanding of the relationship between CheapTickets' revenue 
model and its cost structure. 
The fact that CheapTickets was founded in the pre-Intemet economy could have 
something do with this understanding. The company began as a traditional brick and mortar 
company at a time when adherence to traditional business principles was not considered to be 
optional. As the Internet and the World Wide Web evolved, Mr. Hartley incorporated them 
into his business by focusing on them as alternative distribution channels and marketing 
mechanisms that could enhance CheapTickets' ability to attract new clients and better serve 
existing ones. Had Mr. Hartley forsaken traditional business principles because of the 
Internet and the World Wide Web, CheapTickets would almost certainly not be in business 
today. 
Discussion Summary 
This discussion demonstrates that the principles responsible for making businesses 
successful in the pre-Intemet economy are the same principles responsible for making 
businesses successful in the post-Internet economy. Based on its history, it was evident that 
Priceline fell victim to the "new" economy mode of thinking where business plans were 
obsolete and issues such as value or profit were unimportant. The recent rise in the number of 
business failures served as a harsh reminder that this mode of thinking had to change (See 
Appendix A). 
A retrospective examination of Priceline was used to illustrate what can happen to a 
company when it disregards traditional business principles. There is no way of knowing 
exactly what would happen if Priceline implemented the recommended changes based on the 
strategy development and implementation model. Though this paper takes a definitive stance 
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that the more Priceline uses traditional business principles, the greater the likelihood that it 
will achieve financial success. This stance is bolstered by the comparison of Priceline to 
CheapTickets, which has achieved and sustained financial success in today's economy 
through its adherence to traditional business principles. 
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Contribution Of Research 
This section examines the conceptual contributions of current research in the on­
going debate surrounding today's economy and the role of traditional business principles. 
The limitations of this paper and the model that was developed and applied are then 
considered. Recommendations for future research based on those limitations are 
subsequently listed. Practical implications of the topics covered throughout the paper are then 
examined and followed by concluding remarks. 
Conceptual Contributions 
Three contributions were offered in the paper that were theoretically or conceptually 
based. First, early sections of this paper addressed misconceptions about today's economy 
that have led to questionable decisions being made by those currently funding, running, or 
working for Internet-based businesses. Theoretical assumptions were made regarding those 
decisions in that they stemmed from a false understanding of what the Internet actually is and 
how e-business and e-commerce actually work. Those discussions served to clarify those 
misconceptions and examine how they may have led to poor business decisions. 
Second, this paper demonstrated the absence of definitive proof that the post-Internet 
economy is fundamentally different than the pre-Intemet economy. An analysis of how the 
output growth rates of the pre-Intemet and post-Internet economies interacted with 
unemployment rates and inflation rates illustrated this point. Although the growth rates did 
interact differently, there was no conclusive evidence that today's economy is fundamentally 
different than the economy of the past. Thus, the principles responsible for making 
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businesses successful in the pre-Intemet economy are the same principles that will be 
responsible for making businesses successful in the post-Internet economy. 
The final conceptual contribution came from the discussion involving traditional 
business principles and how many of the concepts based on those principles have evolved 
over time. The effects of the Internet on several of these concepts were examined in the third 
section, which culminated with the introduction of the strategy development and 
implementation model. The model served as a framework for the principles and concepts 
covered throughout the paper. The fourth section demonstrated how Priceline could use the 
model in theory to incorporate the principles and evolved concepts to design and implement a 
strategy that would result in a solid business model aimed at maximizing the value of its 
stock. 
Limitations Of The Paper 
This paper offers an understanding of the subtle differences between the pre-Intemet 
economy and the post-Internet economy and it does have limitations. The primary limitation 
is that this paper was based solely on secondary research. No original studies and no direct 
interviews were conducted while researching this paper. In the rapidly changing nature of 
today's business environment, studies become obsolete and business practices change on a 
daily basis. Rather than focus on a study likely obsolete by the time it was completed, the 
decision was made to examine and subsequently apply the findings of secondary research 
only. 
Another limitation is the strategy development and implementation model was 
applied to only one type of business - one that was purely an Internet-oriented company. Had 
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the model been applied to a company like International Business Machines Corporation 
(IBM), it would have undoubtedly provided more insight into the practicality of the model. 
Implications of the model's application on companies implementing "clicks and bricks" 
approaches, companies with a physical presence as well as an on-line presence, remains to be 
seen. 
Table 4 - Additional, In-Depth Information for Each Model Stage 
Stage 1 - Clarification 
Strategic Action Planning Now: A Guide for Setting and Meeting Your Goals 
by Gate Gable 
Section 1: Pre-planning Preparation 
Stage 2 - External Focus 
Market Driven Strategy: Processes for Creating Value 
by George S. Day 
Pt. 3. Assessing the Competitive Position 
Chapter 5: Understanding Competitive Markets: Their Structure and Attractiveness 
Chapter 6: Assessing Advantages 
Wharton on Dynamic Competitive Strategy 
by George S. Day (Editor), David J. Reibstein (Editor), Robert E. Gunther (Contributor) 
Chapter 1: Assessing Competitive Arenas: Who Are Your Competitors? 
Stage 3 - Internal Focus 
The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into Action 
by Robert S. Kaplan, David P. Norton 
Chapter 5: Internal-Business-Process Perspective 
Corporate Internet Planning Guide: Aligning Internet Strategy With Business Goals 
by Richard J. Gascoyne, Koray Ozcubukcu 
Chapter 1: A Call to Action: Build the Internet/Intranet into Your Business. 
Chapter 2: Rediscovering Your Customer: Serving Existing Needs and Predicting New Ones 
Stage 4 - Construction 
Developing E-Business Systems and Architectures: A Manager *s Guide 
by Paul Harmon, Michael Rosen, Michael Guttman 
Chapter 3: Redesigning Business Processes for E-Business 
Process Mapping: How to Reengineer Your Business Processes 
by V. Daniel Hunt 
Chapter 1: Do You Need a Roadmap? Reengineer Your Business Processes 
Stage 5 - Implementation 
e-Business 2,0: Roadmap for Success 
by Ravi, Dr. Kalakota, Marcia Robinson, Don Tapscott 
Chapter 13: Translating E-Business Strategy into Action: E-Blueprint Formulation 
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The model also focused on a struggling company. This was done in an effort to 
understand why the company was struggling and because it offered an opportunity to make 
reconmiendations. Although cases like Priceline's offer a number of learning opportunities, 
examining the characteristics and practices of companies successfully using the Internet to 
improve their businesses would also provide tremendous learning opportunities. 
Finally, the application of the model was admittedly a superficial one. Superficial 
because the scope of this paper does not allow for a step-by-step approach as to how 
Priceline should actually complete each stage of the model. Instead this example 
demonstrated how the model could serve as a framework to identify the types of changes that 
are necessary for a company like Priceline. Unfortunately, the research and the methodology 
involved with topics like business-process reengineering are too information-rich to be 
adequately discussed here. The table on the previous page provides a list of specific sources 
of information that address these topics in more detail. 
Recommendations For Future Research 
Given the limitations of the resources described above, there are several 
recommendations for future research. First, conduct field interviews of those actually 
involved in today's economy. VCs, entrepreneurs, and dot-com employees would 
undoubtedly offer some unique insights into what strategic business practices are in use 
today. Such insights might lead to some intriguing studies to further augment these 
discussions and analyses. 
Second, examine a wider variety of companies utilizing the Internet. All types of 
business models, from businesses operating as "Internet pure players" to those utilizing a 
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"clicks and bricks" strategy, should be examined. Along those same lines, pre-Intemet 
companies and post-Internet companies should also be evaluated. Initially understanding how 
both established companies and start-up companies have incorporated the Internet into their 
business models is important. Determining the reasons for the resulting successes and 
failures experienced by such companies would especially enhance the topics addressed in this 
paper. 
The last recommendation is to combine the previous recommendations and further 
develop the strategy development and implementation model. Insights gained from the field 
interviews and the lessons learned from studying a variety of companies operating in the 
current business environment would improve upon the relevance of the model. Although, 
improving the relevance of the model is not solely dependent on the completion of the first 
two recommendations. This could also be accomplished by applying, in theory or in practice, 
the model's framework to various businesses. 
Practical Implications 
Although a lot can be said about being one of the first companies to enter a market, a 
lot can also be said about going to market with a viable business model. Unfortunately many 
companies learned that lesson the hard way and are no longer in business. Not surprisingly, 
the companies that adhered to traditional business principles when integrating the Internet 
into their businesses are reaping the rewards. Exhibit H illustrates the decreasing number of 
IPOs in contrast to the increasing usage rates of several popular websites. Although the 
number of Internet IPOs has significantly dropped off in recent months, the usage of websites 
designed in a customer-centric fashion has taken off. This suggests that the promise of the 
Internet is still relatively unfulfilled {Gartner Group, 1999). 
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Businesses must realize that throwing good money after bad in an effort to fulfill that 
promise is no longer acceptable. Rather than relying on investors with deep pockets to keep a 
company in business, companies should instead rely on traditional business principles. This 
paper and the model presented within provide a framework for developing a fundamentally 
sound business model that can fulfill the promise of the Internet and truly achieve financial 
success. 
Conclusions 
Although the economy has evolved as a result of the Internet, it has not proven to be 
fundamentally "new." The Internet by itself is only a tool. Even the most powerful tools in 
business cannot be used in place of traditional business principles. Based on that 
understanding, this paper illustrates that many of the concepts are evolving as a result of the 
Internet. As such, they are still relevant in today's economy because they are based on 
proven business fundamentals. The massive number of Internet-based business failures over 
the past year attests to this fact. Failed businesses demonstrate that the Internet, and 
technology in general, are no substitute for a well-defined strategy aimed at delivering value 
to customers and returning a profit to owners. 
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Appendix A 
2000 Dot-Com Layoffs and Shutdowns 
A comprehensive list of job cuts and closures among Web commerce, content, and services 
companies from January 2000 through December 2000. 
Company Name Status 1 Action 
AdMart 
Online grocery and 
delivery service 
Closely held; backed by 1 
Hong Kong tycoon Jimmy 
Lai 
In December, announced plans to 
shut down, lay off 334 employees 
AIIAdvantage.com 
Online marketer 
Closely held; pulled IPO in 
June 
Laid off 100 in September 
1 
AltaVista 
Search engine UnitofCMGI ! 
Set plans in mid-September to lav 
off 200. or about one-quarter of staff i 
Amazon.com 
1 Online retailer Public 
i 
In Januarv, laid off about 150 
employees, or 2% of work force 
i APB Online 
! Operated crime 
i website 
Sold to Safetytip.com for 
$575,000 in September 
In June, laid off all 140 employees; i 
in Julv, filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy j 
ArtNet.com 
i Art seller Closely held 
In November, laid off 17% of its 
work force and cut back operations 
Asia Online 
Internet services 
Closely held 
Said it November it will lav off 56 
employees, or about 6% of work 
force 
Asic Jeeves 
! Search service Public 
Said it December it will cut 180 full- i 
time jobs, or 25% of its work force 
i Auctions.com 
i Online auctioneer 
Unit of closely held 
Classified Ventures 
Ceased operations in August; 
Layoffs not disclosed 
Autoweb.com 
1 Online auto seller Public 
Said it November it will lav off 25% 
of its work force 
! Beautyjungle.com 
Cosmetics seller Closely held 
Laid off 40 workers, or 60% of work 
force, in October; shut down in 
November 
Bigwords.com 
i Online textbook seller 
Closely held Closed down in October; laid off 100 
70 
Company Name Status Action 
Boo.com 
Clothing retailer 
Brand name was acquired bv 
Fashionmall: technologv 
bought bv Bright Station 
Entered liquidation in Mav; laid off 1 
most of 370 employees at the time; 
Fashionmall relaunched website in 
October 
Boxman 
Music retailer 
Closely held Shut down in October, laid off its 
120 employees 
Britannica.com 
Online encyclopedia j 
Online arm of Encyclopedia i 
Britannica 
Laid off 75 employees, or about 25% 
of work force, in November 
CarOrder.com 
Online auto seller 
Unit of Trilogy Development; 
Suspended operations in August; laid! 
off 100 of remaining 140 workers | 
CBS Internet Group 
Web publisher Unit of Viacom 
' • 1 
Cut 25 emplovees or 25% of staff, in ! 
late May | 
ChamberBiz 
Small-business portal ; Closely held i 
Laid off about 40 of 50 emplovees in 1 
October j 
Chinadotcom 
China portal 
Public; hit high of $156 in 
March, low of $6 in October 
Laid off 48, or 2.8%. in August 
Chipshot.com 
Gol^gear seller 
I 
Defunct 
In October, filed for Chapter 11 1 
bankruptcy-court protection. In 
November, Eco Associates 
purchased assets for undisclosed 
amount | 
Clickmango 
U.K. health website 
Closely held; backed by TV 
star Joanna Lumley 
Site shut down in September, putting i 
about 20 employees out of work 
CitiKey 
Wireless European 
city guide 
Closely held; backed by 
Crescendo Ventures, Atlas 
Venture and Kennet Capital; | 
now in bankruptcy 
proceedings 
Laid off all 90 emplovees in 
November, as company entered 
liquidation 
Covad 
Communications 
DSL provider 
Public 
Said in November it plans to lav off i 
400 employees or 13% of its work 
force 
Cozone.com 
Computer retailer Unit of CompUSA 
Shut down in March 
CUseeMe Networks 
Intemet video 
services 
Public Said in November it will eliminate 
36 jobs, or 22% of work force 
71 
Company Name Status Action 1 
Cyberhomes 
Online real-estate 
seller 
Closely held Shut down in November 
D^a.com 
Buyers guide, | 
discussions 
Closely held; pulled IPO 
plans in June 
Laid off 50 people, or one-third of 
staff, in September 
Digital 
Entertainment 
Network 
Web content 
Closely held Closed down in Mav 
Discovery.com 
Online arm of 
Discovery 
Communications 
Closely held Laid off 45% of staff in November 
Doubleclick 
Online advertising 
services 
Public 
Laid off undisclosed number of 
workers, but less than 10%, in 
December 
Drkoop.com 
Health news, advice 
Public; stock peaked near 
$20 last Dec., now trades 
around $1 
Laid off one-third of staff in May; 
cut remaining staff bv another third i 
in August, leaving about 80 
employees 
DrDrew.com 
Dating, health advice 
Closely held; editor is MTV 
Loveline host Dr. Drew 
Pinskv; assets sold to 
Drkoop.com in November 
In September, laid off 14 of 20 
remaining staffers, down from 70 
three months earlier 
! Drugstore.com 
1 Retailer 
Public; stock trades under $3, 
down from high of $55 in 
December 
In October, laid off 60 emplovees. or 1 
10% of work force 
1 DSL.net 
i DSL provider Public 
Said in December it plans to cut 141 
jobs, or 28% of its work force 
1 Egreetings.com 
! Web retailer 
Public; stock trades at under I 
$1 a share; CEO resigned in ! 
October 
In October, said it plans to cut 60 
jobs, or 34% of work force 
1 Emusic.com 
1 Music download 
; website 
Public; stock trades at about ; 
$1, down from high of 
$19.63 in December 
Laid off 20% of work force, or about 
40 employees, in June 
i E-Stamp 
Logistics Firm Public 
Cut work force bv 30% to 84 in 
November as it set plans to exit 
online-postage business 
72 
Company Name Status Action 
Eve.com 
Cosmetics retailer 
Closely held 
In October, announced it will shut 
down and let go almost all 164 
employees 
Evite 
Invitation service 
Closely held, put itself up for 
sale in November 
Laid off 60% of its staff in 
November, in preparation for sale 
Firstlook.com 
Movie, TV Previews : 
Closely held; backed by 
idealab! 
Laid off 34 of its 103 employees in 
October 
Hrst-e group 
Online bank Closely held 
Cut 69 jobs, or 17% of work force, 
in October 
Fogdog.com 
Sporting goods 
retailer 
Acquired bv Global Sports in i 
October for about $40 
million in stock 
With the purchase, 125 jobs out of 
150 were planned to be cut 
Food.com 
Online ordering, 
content 
Closely held, backed by 
heavyweights McDonald's, 
Kraft, TV Guide and 
Blockbuster 
In September, cut staff bv 100, or 
50%; laid off two senior executives 
Foodline.com 
Restaurant 
reservations 
provider 
Closely held In August, cut staff by about 54 
Free-
Scholarships.com 
Education-financing | 
content 
Unit of MathSoft Closed down in September, 
eliminating 16 jobs 
Freei Networks 
Free Internet provider 
Rival Netzero acquired 
certain assets 
Filed for bankruptcv in October 
Furniture.com Pulled IPO in June Laid off most remaining workers in November, set plans to shut down 
Garden.com Went public in September ^9; now trades under $1 
Slashed work force bv 93 people, or 
30%, in September; in November, 
said it will close retail operations, 
laying off 153 workers 
G^r.com 
Backed by Amazon.com, 
Gear is now a unit of 
Overstock.com 
In September, firm lavs off 22; in 
October, firm was bought bv 
Overstock, which hires 45 remaining j 
employees 
Internet Pictures 
360-degree imaging Public 
Cut 175 positions, or 20% of work 
force, in October 
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Company Name Status Action 
iXL Enterprises 
Web consulting firm Public 
Eliminated 350 positions in 
September 
Kibu.com 
Teen girls' website 
Closely held; was backed by 
Netscape co-founder Jim 
Clark 
Shut down website in October 
Kozmo.com 
Delivery service 
Closelv held: pulled IPO in 
August 
Cut 24 jobs in June, then slashed 2751 
jobs, or 10% of total, in August, then 
another 40 later in the month 
Lante 
Internet consulting 
Public Reduced staff bv 44 full-time and 21 i 
part-time positions in December 
Living.com 
Furniture retailer 
Closely held; partner of 
Amazon.com and Starbucks i 
In August, filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy and laid off 275 ; 
employees 
Mail.com 
E-mail provider Public 
Said in October it plans to lav off 
15% of its 632 employees i 
Mall.com 
Retail hub Closely held 
Cut 20 jobs, or 35% of staff, in 
August 
MaMaMedia 
Content for kids Closely held 
In June, laid off 30 of 150 workers: ! 
in October, laid off 40%. or about 40 
people: in November, cut staff again i 
, to 15 people, as it tried to find 
buyer, partner 
Miadora 
Online jeweler 
Closely held Closed site in September, lavine off i 
almost all 77 workers 
More.com 
Online pharmacy 
Closely held Cut staff bv 30% in October, follows i 
20% reduction in June 
Mortgage.com 
Online mortgages 
Public Said in late October that it will close ! 
and lav off most of its 618 
employees [ 
MTVi 
Music website 
Unit of Viacom; in Sept, 
pulled plans for IPO 
Cut 105 people, or 25% of work 
force, as it canceled IPO | 
MyPoints.com 
Online marketing 
Public; merged with 
Cybergold this year 
Cut 120 jobs in October in wake of ! 
Cybergold purchase 
NBCi 
Community and 
content portal 
Public, formed by merger of i 
Snap, Xoom and certain 
NBC assets; stock trades 
around $5, down from over 
$100 in January 
In August, cut 170 jobs, or 20% of 
staff: in October, president quit: job : 
won't be filled 
i 
i 
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Company Name Status Action 1 
News 
Digital 
Media 
Online media division of 
News Corp. 
Laid off about 15% of its news staff, 
or 82 jobs, Reuters reported in 
October 
Next Media 
Online publisher Public; trades in Hong Kong i 
In Julv. sacked 98 workers at its 
Web sites, appledaily.com and 
nextmedia.com; in October, cut 
another 90 jobs and closed 11 of its 1 
25 Web sites; in October, unit 
AdMart Travel said it plans to shut 
down 
OneMain.com 
Internet service 
provider 
Acquired by Earthlink Said in April it plans to cut work 
force of 1,500 by 15% over next year 
Onvia 
Small-business hub 
Public In September, cut 85 positions, or 
about 16% of work force | 
Oxygen Media 
Cable-TV and 
Internet content 
Closely held Reduced staff bv 44 full-time and 21 i 
part-time positions in December 
i Pandesic 
E-conmierce services 
Was joint venture of SAP 
and Intel 
Shut down in Julv; laid off all 400 
workers 
= pAsia 
Retailer and 
auctioneer 
Closely held 
Said it November it laid off about 
10% of its work force 
Petopia 
Pet-supplies retailer 
Closely held; affiliated with i 
Petco 
Laid off 120 emplovees, or 60% of 
its work force, in October 
; Pets.com 
Pet-supplies retailer Public 
In November, said it will shut down i 
and laid off about 255 of its 320 ] 
employees 
Pixelon 
j Streaming media 
I technology 
Defunct Laid off most emplovees in Mav 
after being forced into Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceedings 
i PlanetRx.com Public 
1 
Set plans to cut as much as 15% of 
work force, or up to 50 jobs, and 
move to Memphis, Tenn., from • 
Calif. 
Pop.com 
Closely held; backed by 
Steven Spielberg and Ron 
Howard 
Closed operations, laid off 80 in 
September 
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Priceline.com Inc. 
Name-your-own-price • 
retailer 
Public 
1 
Set plans in November to lav off 87 i 
of its 535 employees; in December 
said it would cut another 48 jobs and 
postpone new services 
Priceiine WebHouse 
Gas, grocery website s 
Closely held affiliate of 
Priceline.com 
Said in October it will close 
operations, putting 375 out of work 
Productopia 
Buying guide Closely held 
— • '"••••• - - 1 
Closed down in October, putting 
about 70 people out of work 1 
Pseudo 
Programs 
Web broadcaster 
Closely held Closed down in September, laving i 
off 175 employees; had laid off 58 in! 
June 
Quepasa.com 
Spanish-language 
portal 
Went public in June 1999 
Following round of lavoffs in Mav. 
cut about two-thirds of remaining 
work force in November, leaving it j 
with 20 employees j 
Quokka Sports 
Sports news site 
Public; acquired Total Sports 
in November 
Laid off 90 employees, or 20% of 
work force, in November after 
closing Total Sports deal 
Reel.com 
Movie retailer 
Unit of Hollywood 
Entertainment 
Laid off all 150 employees in June, 
refers buyers to Buy.com 
Renren Media 
Chinese Web portal 
Public; News Corp. owns 
minority stake 
In August, laid off 102 workers, or 
38% of work force 
Riffage 
Online music 
company 
Closely held Said it December it will shut down 
1 i 
Sandbox 
Online games 
Closely held 
... _ 
Said in November it will cut 30 jobs, 
or one-quarter of work force 
Sclent 
Web consulting 
Public In December set plans to cut 25% of 
its work force, or 460 positions 
Scour 
Online media file-
sharing service 
Backers included talent 
manager Michael Ovitz; 
assets purchased by 
Listen.com in November 
Filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1 
October and said it will shut down; it i 
laid off 80% of work force in ! 
September 
Snowball.com 
Teen content Public 
In third quarter, cut work force by 
about 15%, or 50 people 
Shockwave.com Unit of Macromedia 
s 
Laid off 20 of its 170 employees in 
September 
76 
Company Name Status Action 
Space.com 
Outer space content 
Closely held; run by former j 
CNN anchor Lou Dobbs 
In October, cuts 22 jobs, or about 
20% of work force 
Stamps.com 
Online postage 
Public; trades under $5 a 
share; CEO and CFO 
resigned in October 
Cut about 240 jobs in October, or 
about 40% of the total 
Stan Lee 
Media 
Online animation 
Public Eliminated 19 positions as part of 
outsourcing deal in September j 
J 
StarMedia 
Latin american portal ; Public 
Cut 125 jobs, or 15%. in September 1 
Streaniline.com 
Grocery service 
Went public in June 1999 at | 
$10 a share; has traded below; 
$1 since mid-August 
Shut down in November 
Stockback 
Online rewards firm 
Closely held; backed by RRE 
Ventures, Neo Carta 
Ventures 
Cut work force bv 29 employees in 
November 
Supertracks 
Online music 
distributer 
Closely held 
Laid off about 40 employees, or a 
third of its workers, in September 
theglobe.com 
Web community 
Public, trades at under $1 a 
share 
Cut 51 jobs in third quarter 
Techies.com Closely held; withdrew IPO plans in May 
Laid off 60 employees, or 12% of 
staff, in June 
ThingWorld 
Internet multimedia 
i technology 
Closely held, backed by 
CMGI@ventures, Microsoft, : 
others 
Laid off 70% of staff, or 35 workers, i 
in December 
j 
Tom.com 
Hong Kong 
portal 
Public; trades in Hong Kong | 
Laid off 80 people, or 16% of staff, 
in July; unit GoChinaGo cut 50 jobs j 
in August 
i Toysmart Controlled by Disney Site shut down in Mav; firm filed for Chapter 11 in June 
Urban Box Office 
Urban content hub Closely held 
Filed for bankruptcy and laid off 
most of 330 workers in November 
i Urbanfietch.com 
i Delivery service 
Closelv held; stopped 
delivering movies in 
September and exited 
consumer market entirelv in 
October 
Made substantial, undisclosed cuts 
of 400-strong New York staff; cut all 1 
60 jobs in London j 
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Value 
America 
Retailer 
In October, signed letter of 
intent to sell most assets to 
Merisel 
Filed for Chapter 11 in August; laid 1 
off 185 employees 
i 
Walker Digital 
Intellectual property 
developer 
Closely held 
Laid off about 80% of headquarters i 
staff, or 100 workers, in November | 
WebMD 
Health website 
Public; formed by merger of 
Healtheon, WebMD, 
Carelnsite, others 
Announced plans in September to 
cut 1,100 jobs; co-CEO Arnold | 
resigned in October 
Worldsport 
Sports website Closely held 
1 
Shut down site i 
Women.com 
Internet publisher 
Public Reduced staff by 85 jobs, or about 
25% of work force, in December 
Xenote 
Song bookmarking' 
; technology 
Closely held Closed down in September 
1 
Xceed 
: E-business consultant ; 
Public; stock peaked at $48 
in Jan., now trades around $1 | 
Said in September that it will cut 75 
jobs, or 12% of work force 
Xpedior 
1 Web consulting firm 
Public; 80% owned by 
PSINet, which is looking to 
sell the stake 
In September, cut 270 jobs, 
including 200 consultants: In 
December, announced 380 more 
lavoffs 
Youbetcom 
ONline horse racing Closely held 
Laid off 34 emplovees, or 29% of 
staff, in November 
1 Z.com Closely held; backed by idealab In October, cut half its staff of 95 
ZipLink 
Dial-up, DSL Internet 
provider 
Public 
Said it will close its business, lav off 
all employees, in November 
1 Zip2.com UnitofCMGI 
In October, firm said about 140 
emplovees would either be switched 
to other CMGI jobs or let go 
Source: The Wall Street Journal 
http://interactive.wsj.coin/public/resources/documents/dotcomlayoffs.htm 
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